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involves the limitations on institutions trying to incorporate cultur-
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and uncontested. Using the specific case of Cyprus, I propose an al-
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Cyprus: At a Dead End
This paper draws attention to two issues often dismissed when assessing cultural 
expressions during conflict and its aftermath, or during a stage of transition be-
tween conflict and a stable form of society and governance. The first pertains to 
the memories of victims and perpetrators as a resource for cultural heritage iden-
tification, while the second involves the limitations placed on institutions to incor-
porate culture in the transition process, which is considered to be mainly political. 
This dichotomy is also reflected in the UNESCO doctrine. On one hand, it honours 
political agreements where actors are unquestionable and uncontested, while at 
the same time it dismisses the memories arising from conflicts, which remain un-
recognized unless those memories are included in national narratives.1 
Using the specific case of Cyprus, I propose an alternative lens through which 
to view cultural heritage in conflict and post-conflict areas, highlighting the limita-
tions of the international cultural heritage system to address the issue. Looking at 
Cyprus and its unresolved political issues, I propose an alternative perspective to 
elucidate the role of cultural heritage in the formation of an inclusive society. This 
perspective is Transitional Justice. In particular, I argue that Transnational Justice 
offers an effective platform to redress cultural heritage. Furthermore, I address 
the two limitations mentioned above.
Cyprus, as one of the oldest unresolved conflicts in the world, can play an 
important role in understanding the factors and facets that contribute to the de-
struction of heritage assets. In as much as an in-depth examination of the causes 
and roots of the Cyprus issue is beyond the scope of this paper, it is sufficient to 
note here that scholars propose different perspectives and theories on how and 
why the division of the island emerged and why the conflict has remained unre-
solved. Some scholars point to the lack of a common Cypriot identity, the failure of 
peace talks and discussions, and the economic disparities between the sectors of 
the population, while others emphasize the historical divide between the Turkish 
and Greek Cypriots (and their mother countries) and the militarization of the issue 
as the crucial factors.2 
1 The general recognition of this statement, as a consequence of analysis of the cultural heritage concept 
over time, conventions, expert meetings, declarations and doctrinal documents, represents a step forward 
in acknowledgment of the political component of heritage, at the global, regional and local levels. The politi-
cal component is by far the most relevant consideration to understanding the current heritage condition of 
Famagusta. Although this is an academic work, it is unrealistic to leave to academics the responsibility to 
prevent the additional decay of the site. The reality speaks for itself. International NGOs and independent 
practitioners can, and have, produced an important body of literature on Famagusta. However, as it stands 
now, cultural heritage works remain a highly political endeavor for both the discussion of this research and 
for the politics of Cyprus and North Cyprus. The direct linkage between UNESCO – Nation State – and 
policy design operates as an important obstacle on resolving the current situation of Famagusta. 
2 For additional information on the contemporary historiography for the Mediterranean and Cyprus, see: 
P. Horden, N. Purcell, The Corrupting Sea: A Study on Mediterranean History, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford 
2000; I. Malkin (ed.), Mediterranean Paradigms and Classical Antiquity, Routledge, London 2005; T. Morgan, 
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In the 1950s, the dominant political ideology in the island was to unite with 
Greece (Enosis). This was championed by the National Organization of Cypriot 
Fighters (EOKA).3 The group staged a violent terrorist campaign against the Brit-
ish administration. Following a series of conferences between the British, Greeks, 
Turks, and representatives from the Cypriot groups, the new Republic of Cyprus 
was created in 1960. As a newly independent State formed out of a volatile society 
without a strong sense of trust or a shared identity, cracks in the system quickly 
emerged.4 
Turkish Cypriots, who feared the union of Cyprus with Greece, simultaneously 
clamored for the division of the island. The decade following independence was 
characterized by sporadic intensification of inter-communal disputes. By 1963, 
fighting ensued following the proposed changes to the constitution. In 1974, the 
inter-communal conflict in the island reached its peak when the Cypriot National 
Guard, supported by Athens, declared a coup against the elected President Arch-
bishop Makarios III. When the skirmishes between the two groups intensified (and 
when the union of Cyprus with Greece appeared imminent) Turkey sent in troops 
and invaded the island. In the course of the summer, Turkey’s forces occupied about 
30% of the island, causing a massive population flow from north to south by Greek 
Cypriots, and from south to north by Turkish Cypriots. The division of the island 
was formalized in 1983 with the creation of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cy-
prus, a State unrecognized by the United Nations, and this status has remained in 
place until the present day. 
Famagusta’s (a heritage town located in North Cyprus) main asset derives from 
its importance as a reminder and memory of the turbulent past of the Mediterra-
nean basin and its connections between East and West. Yet it cannot be under-
Sweet and Bitter Island: A History of the British in Cyprus, I.B. Tauris, London 2011; A-M. Olteanu, “The Euro-
pean Union and the Local Freeze: The Cyprus Conflict”, paper presented at the course Challenges of a New 
Europe: Chances in Crises, Utrecht School of Governance, The Netherlands, 18-24 April 2010, http://www.
inclusionexclusion.nl/site/?Previous_editions:Edition_2008:Papers_Participants [accessed: 4.12.2014]. 
3 “EOKA was organized by Col. Georgios Grivas […] with the support of Makarios III, Orthodox arch-
bishop of Cyprus. […] By early 1957, however, a reinforced British army renewed attacks on the mountain 
hideouts of the considerably outnumbered EOKA. Violence subsided after Makarios’s release from deten-
tion in exile in March 1957, though there were increased hostilities leading up to mid-1958, when EOKA 
clashed with Turkish Cypriot guerrillas. In 1958 Makarios announced he would accept independence for 
Cyprus rather than enosis. In February 1959 a compromise agreement was concluded between Turkish and 
Greek representatives at Zürich and endorsed by the Cypriot communities in London, and EOKA disband-
ed. […] The Greek government reentered Cyprus secretly to form EOKA B, to ‘prevent a betrayal of enosis’. 
[…] Makarios (then president of Cyprus) officially proscribed EOKA B in April 1974, three months before he 
was ousted and before Turkish forces invaded and divided the country in a brief civil war. In 1978, EOKA B 
declared its dissolution.” EOKA (Encyclopædia Britannica Online), http://www.britannica.com/topic/EOKA 
[accessed: 8.11.2015]. 
4 See R. Bryant, Imagining the Modern: The Cultures of nationalism in Cyprus, I.B. Tauris, London 2011; 
J. Scott, World Heritage as a Model for Citizenship: the Case of Cyprus, “International Journal of Heritage Stud-
ies” 2002, Vol. 8, p. 100. 
Carlos Jaramillo
202
N
r 
2
 2
0
1
5
 (1
)
RESEARCH ARTICLES
stood only in historic terms, but also in the value of the memories it encompasses. 
Famagusta is a ruined city, unable to transcend from the past to the present and 
serve as a witness to the societies, ethnicities, and cults arising from the Persian 
and British empires. Next to the old town of Famagusta lies the former tourist dis-
trict of Varosha. It used to be a highly visited area until the 1970s, which boasted 
of its buildings from the “modern” period between 1950s and 1970s. Varosha was 
entangled in the design of the “Green Line” – a division established by the UN to 
prevent further violence between the two predominant communities in Cyprus. 
The “line” also divided Nicosia, giving it the dubious title of “last divided city 
in Europe”. Together with the Green Line, it comprised the so-called “buffer zone”, 
a form of international territory ruled by UN forces with no political alliances in the 
island. This buffer zone serves to house the “good offices” and host talks and meet-
ings surrounding the Cyprus issue. In other words, the buffer zone merely divided 
up two heritage sites: Varosha in the Municipality of Famagusta, and the city of Nic-
osia. These areas represent two different moments in time, suspended and hang-
ing in the balance by international forces for the last forty years. Contrary to the 
original objective of the buffer zone, which was to prevent violence and escalation, 
the legitimization of the division has caused irreversible damage to the heritage in 
Cyprus. Heritage assets have been neglected. Famagusta’s suburb of Varosha was 
cleared of its inhabitants. Its buildings were deserted, with some being physically 
destroyed, and Varosha remains unoccupied to this day.
In this regard Cyprus, and the city of Famagusta in particular, provide an ideal 
paradigm not only to understand the connections between the East and the West 
throughout time, but also to our understanding of cultural heritage. Cultural herit-
age, being an asset that transcends generations, recognizes peoples from all periods 
and backgrounds, including those arising from any recent period, whether conflict-
laden or not. It also speaks of fairness in relation to the past because it allows for 
the elaboration and interpretation of multiple narratives, without favouring one or 
the other. It is a reflection of the plurality of a society, rather than a unified identity 
constructed between communities. This is an ideal approach to the case of Cyprus. 
At the same time, cultural heritage offers a scenario for memorialization of 
the memories that have impacted culture and society. At a deep level, cultural 
heritage reflects facts that are beyond identity, boundaries, and political frame-
works. Since everyone is entitled to their own culture, cultural heritage is regard-
ed as a part of Human Rights.5 It constitutes a legal argument for communities 
that lie both within and outside boundaries, such as cosmopolitan communities, 
diasporas, refugees, internally displaced people, and people living in contested 
or unrecognized areas, allowing them to claim their own cultural and heritage 
 
5 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948, UNGA Res 217 A(III). 
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expressions.6 In this respect cosmopolitan communities, such as those that rec-
ognize the cultural heritage present in Famagusta as their own, cannot expect 
acknowledgement of their primary rights (including cultural rights) to be based 
on the legitimacy of governments. 
As is visible in Cyprus, the governments from both parts of the island have 
chosen coercion over the heritage assets of Famagusta as political argument. 
Work in cultural heritage in the north is considered subversive to both forms of 
sovereignty in Cyprus. This is the case unless and until cultural heritage work is 
seen as a sign of recognition of the accountability of the North over those assets. 
Alternatively, the work is triangulated through international organizations with 
regional mandates, such as the EU with its focus on historic structures, mainly in 
Nicosia. Cultural heritage has, throughout the years, been assumed to be a moral 
issue. When understood as such, it does not require the argument of universality. 
It simply exists for everyone, without need for characterization, segmentation, 
and classification.7 
Cultural Heritage and its Capacity to Hold Memory(ies) 
and Memorialization at the Same Time 
Cultural heritage offers information that is fundamental in the construction of so-
cial life. The role of politics, religion and institutions frequently move at differing 
paces, in different directions, and pursue different objectives than those of one’s 
community, society and generation. This information is frequently represented by 
the memories that can be read in expressions of cultural heritage. Buildings and 
sites hold memories that are sometimes difficult to process, but should neverthe-
less be nourished in order to offer clues to those memories to future generations. 
Heritage discussions have the ability to provide a multilayered, multidimensional 
and multiform setting in which conversations about memories can be carried out 
– particularly those that are difficult to face in the present, but which others may 
analyse and see differently in the future.
Viewed in this light, it becomes crucial to discuss the role of both memory 
and forgetting. Here I contextualize memory within the framework of heritage 
and explain the cord linking heritage and memory. To put it plainly, the relation-
ship between heritage and memory consists of two fundamental facets: 1) mem-
ory shapes, influences, creates, and justifies heritage; and 2) heritage organizes, 
frames, and in extreme cases even disregards memory. 
6 F. Shaheed, Access to Cultural Heritage as Human Right, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/CulturalRights/
Pages/Consultation10Feb2011.aspx [accessed: 5.10.2015]. 
7 M. Barnett, M. Finnemore, Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics, Cornell Uni-
versity Press, Ithaca, NY 2004.
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As Macdonald puts it the context of the Cyprus case:
distinct affective sensibilities embedded in different socio-political situations that 
may co-exist – in this case, between the different populations of the island. […] after 
the 1974 division of the island, “nostalgia… became a patriotic duty” for Greek Cyp-
riots who had been displaced […] Turkish Cypriots , however faced “an official rheto-
ric that the past was all negative and that the north was now their true ‘homeland’”, 
which meant that they were not supposed to “feel nostalgic towards the homes they 
left behind in 1974, as that could imply that they wished to return or that life there 
was not always bleak” […] in what is perhaps an over-stated opposition, one may char-
acterize the Greek Cypriot position as nostomania and that of Turkish Cypriots as 
nostophobia […].8
In other words, Cyprus is immersed in a political turmoil that prevents the is-
land from recognising memories of destruction and despair – which could help in 
building an inclusive society – except in the context of an agreed separation or full 
unification. The construction, definition, and development of the concept of mem-
ory have taken different paths and have been adapted to contemporary positions 
on human, and therefore social, behaviour. 
Cultural Memory, when related to other human beings, is studied in the form 
of relationships and links which have a direct relationship with the memory aspect 
of cultural heritage. Jan Assman, a German Egyptologist, has reflected on this as-
pect of memory. He argues that Cultural Memory serves to save knowledge that 
directs long-term behaviour and experience, as opposed to Communicative Mem-
ory, which is subject to everyday life and usually lasts only three to four genera-
tions. Similar to Cultural Memory, the concept of Social Memory is also important 
as a perspective on the function of memory in societal unification. Paul Connerton 
explains that Social Memory “[is] control of a society’s memory [that] largely condi-
tions the hierarchy of power. Seen in this light, social memory is inherently instru-
mental: individuals and groups recall the past not for its own sake, but as a tool to 
bolster different aims and agendas.”9
But the question arises: how do personal memories become a part of collec-
tive memory? Some scholars argue that aspects like rituals and traditional activities 
within communities condition their memory formation.10 There are forms of memo-
ry that do not necessarily come from individual experiences but from the context.11 
08 S. Macdonald, Memorylands: Heritage and Identity in Europe Today, Routledge, New York 2013, p. 94.
09 S. Hoelscher, D.H. Alderman, Memory and place: geographies of a critical relationship, “Social & Cultural 
Geography” 2004, Vol. 5, p. 349.
10 For Kasabova this argument is: “Unlike the notion of commemoration, the notion of memory (at least as 
regards conscious and personal memory) implies that we consider ourselves as agents: when we retrieve an 
event from our past experience we construct the past by positioning it and taking it as true.” A. Kasabova, 
Memory, Memorials and Commemoration, “History and Theory” 2008, Vol. 47, p. 335.
11 Kansteiner expresses it as: “Elites produced sites of memory in language, monuments, and archives 
which had one common referent, the nation-state, and which strove to secure the future of the nation-state 
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These “collective” memories have grown into a strong argument for the regulariza-
tion of the Cyprus political issue and unification of the island,12 and to some extent 
to the shape of its identities.13 This issue has permeated the cultural heritage sector 
and its very core principles. Traditionally, the inclusion of memory within heritage 
requires a collective recognition and endorsement. This principle may be viewed 
as an assertion that governments, as publicly elected bodies, have a collective en-
dorsement, and that what States recognize as cultural heritage is therefore in the 
public’s interest.14 In principle, this rationale is valid. However a closer look reveals 
how “collectiveness” is positioned as exclusively pertaining to what the majority 
recognizes, decides, and chooses to call cultural heritage. For example, those who 
resisted the siege of Famagusta in 1571 are seen as heroes, while the Ottoman 
army is portrayed as the victimizers, when, in fact, the Ottoman period positively 
contributed to the cultural heritage landscape of Cyprus as well as Europe. This 
suggests that the structure of power embedded in governments reflects the will 
of the elite, and often the dismissal of any threat to unity and solidarity. The same 
is true with respect to heritage views and recognition, where power politics is also 
apparent. 
The constantly changing relationship between memory and society has im-
pacted heritage formation. In this regard, two questions are pertinent: First, to 
what extent does the memory produced at the societal level transform, impact, 
and/or destroy the character of cultural heritage? Second, to what extent can 
cultural heritage be a game changer in the shaping of narratives that identify and 
define a community, in particular a community under conflict or in a post-conflict 
phase? These are fundamental questions that can produce more than one answer, 
depending on one’s approach to cultural heritage. But what is important is that this 
strong relationship is acknowledged. The intention of this discussion is to highlight 
that as part of the dynamics of change in memory and identity, cultural heritage 
expressions also change. Furthermore, the physical characteristics of cultural 
through compelling inventions of its traditions.” W. Kansteiner, Finding meaning in memory: A methodological 
critique of collective memory studies, “History and Theory” 2002, Vol. 41, p. 183.
12 In Golden’s perspective: “Leaders may, literally, dig up evidence of events long forgotten that may have 
had little significance in the social memory of the past but that are used to restructure or eliminate social 
memory in the present […].” Ch. Golden, Where Does Memory Reside, and Why Isn’t It History, “American An-
thropologist” 2005, Vol. 107, p. 271.
13 “[…] new political culture theory highlights the discursive dimensions of politics, seeing political lan-
guage, symbolism, and claim-making as a constitutive of interest and identities.” J.K. Olick, Collective Memo-
ry: The Two Cultures, “Sociological Theory” 1999, Vol. 17, p. 337.
14 The following clarifies this term: “Nancy Wood has delineated such an approach in her account of collec-
tive memory, the unconscious, and intentionality: [W]hile the emanation of individual memory is primarily 
subject to the laws of the unconscious, public memory – whatever its unconscious vicissitudes – testifies to 
a will or desire on the part of some social group or disposition of power to select and organize representa-
tions of the past so that these will be embraced by individuals as their own. If particular representations of 
the past have permeated the public domain, it is because they embody an intentionality – social, political, 
institutional and so on – that promotes or authorizes their entry.” Kansteiner, op. cit., 188.
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heritage reflect the multiplicity of transformations the heritage experiences over 
time. The division of Cyprus into two different and antagonistic regions polarized 
any discussion on the memory aspects of culture. However, the political division 
of the island does not reflect a division of its cultural heritage, because heritage 
is formed by communities and the memories embedded in it. In defiance of the 
political imposition of this division, new communities in the south and in the north 
have added new meanings to the heritage expressions that have been utilized in 
the political contestation in Cyprus. 
A highly sensitive aspect of the history of Cyprus and of the relationships be-
tween regions in this part of the world is the Armenian population. The year 2015 
marks one century following the ethnic cleansing of the Armenian population in 
what is today’s Turkey. Cyprus, given its location and role in the politics of the re-
gion, can trace its Armenian population back to 1570, when the siege of Nicosia 
took place. Armenians were not indifferent to the events that marked the political 
and ethnic turmoil of the region throughout the centuries. While this paper does 
not explore the historical events, their political and social consequences, or the 
current political affairs that involve the Armenian population in Cyprus, it must be 
highlighted that the potential of the Armenian quarter in Famagusta is a key com-
ponent of heritage construction, memorialisation, and justice in transition.
Transitional Justice: A Platform
The long history of conflict and the unresolved international recognition of Cy-
prus is reflected in the current deplorable state of its cultural heritage. More 
importantly, the case of Cyprus and its vital heritage assets is evidence of the 
limitations of the international system governing cultural heritage. The limita-
tions of the current doctrine in cultural heritage are evident when we scan the 
condition of cultural heritage in the conflicts that have emerged after the crea-
tion of UNESCO.15 For instance, the 1990s Balkan war remains sensitive to this 
day in heritage terms.16 In this respect, the intricacy involved in framing a cultur-
15 Additional works on this aspect are: M.R.T. Dumper, C. Larkin, The Politics of Heritage and the Limitations 
of International Agency in Contested Cities: a Study of the Role of UNESCO in Jerusalem’s Old City, “Review of 
International Studies” 2012, Vol. 38; J. Blake, International Cultural Heritage Law, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford 2015; R. Harrison, Heritage: Critical Approaches, Routledge, London 2013.
16 “Cultural heritage is often seen as an important factor in explaining the post-socialist landscape of the 
Balkans. The destruction of socialist identity and common heritage, as well as inventing new traditions and 
interpretations of the past, is a part of the general process of political, economic and cultural transition 
together with processes of European integration of the region. As the consequence of discrepant historical 
contexts as well as Western symbolic geography, the image of the Balkans has remained full of dichotomies 
– it is a misread, forgotten and isolated region, the “other” rejected Europe, the periphery – and it is adorned 
as an incredible phantasm of the Orient with passion, colours and emotions.” M.D. Šešić, L.R. Mijatović, Bal-
kan Dissonant Heritage Narratives (and Their Attractiveness) for Tourism, “American Journal of Tourism Man-
agement” 2014, Vol. 3, p. 10. 
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al heritage that openly contests nations and their constituents adds to the diffi-
culties of engaging in effective and useful initiatives aimed at the preservation 
of heritage. 
Moreover, the principles and legal definitions of property prevent realistic 
actions with respect to managing heritage. The consistent reaffirmation of this 
vision has built a system that excludes or neglects silenced and contested voices 
and memories – voices and memories that by all means have a right to justice and 
to recognition as part of fundamental cultural expressions. What really happens 
to the plethora of voices and memories present in heritage in places undergoing 
transition? What management framework should be applied to ensure that diverse 
memories are not dismissed in favour of the creation of a national myth? Both parts 
of Cyprus have certainly expressed their own arguments for not engaging in main-
tenance of the heritage located in the North. That has led to its neglect. Moving 
a step away from the discussion of memory, I now explore Transitional Justice as 
a legal framework for Famagusta; as a way to support the process of its coming 
to terms with its past based on dealing with its memories – including what is re-
membered, neglected, and forgotten. In this regard, Transitional Justice is useful 
for a number of reasons. 
Transitional Justice is an alternative lens through which to view and discuss 
those gaps and caveats that are present when working on cultural heritage in 
places that, for a variety of reasons, are undergoing a transitional process from 
conflict. Transitional Justice is a legal model that facilitates transition from a trou-
bled past to improved stages of social life. This is done in reference to past events 
by adopting transitional judicial and civil measures in order to re-frame the leg-
acies of human rights violations, injustice, exclusion, and dilemmas at the moral, 
legal and political levels caused by such events.17 This framework differentiates 
five major topics that need to be addressed: 1) criminal prosecutions; 2) truth 
commissions; 3) reparations programmes; 4) security system reforms; and 5) me-
morialization.18 The utilization of Transitional Justice in rebuilding communities’ 
17 “The field [Transitional Justice] has been described as an international web of ‘individuals and insti-
tutions whose internal coherence is held together by common concepts, practical aims, and distinctive 
claims for legitimacy’. Indeed, the study of how societies emerging from periods of dictatorship and armed 
conflict that left a legacy of gross human rights violations is not only confined to academic research, but 
also of international NGOs.” L. Viaene, Voices from the Shadows: The Role of Cultural Contexts in Transitional 
Justice Processes. Maya Q’eqchi’ Perspectives from Post-Conflict Guatemala [PhD diss.], Ghent University 
2010, pp. 4-5. 
18 See R.N. Lebow, The Memory of Politics, in: R.N. Lebow, W. Kantsteiner, C. Fogu (eds.), The Politics of 
Memory in Post-War Europe, Duke University Press, Durham, NC, USA 2006; B. Davis, Violence and memory 
of the Nazi Past in 1960s-70s West German Protests, in: P. Gassert, A.E. Steinweis (eds.), Coping with the Nazi 
Past: West German Debates on Nazism and Generations Conflict, 1955-1975, Berghahn Books, New York 2006; 
H. Rousso, The Vichy Syndrome: History and Memory in France since 1944, trans. A. Goldhammer, Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge 1994; R.L. Braham, The Politics of Genocide: The Holocaust in Hungary, con-
densed edition, Wayne University Press in association with the United States Holocaust Memorial Muse-
um, Detroit 2000.
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trust and peace has become a laboratory for emerging communities to come to 
terms with their violent past. 
This framework encompasses the idea that fairness that leads to justice, and 
that justice is impartial to all, being therefore universal. The framework also em-
phasizes the need to enforce memories of troubled times as a way to prevent sim-
ilar events from emerging again in the future. I have chosen three characteristics 
that can contribute to the elucidation of a future for Famagusta’s cultural heritage. 
First, Transitional Justice is a framework within which to discuss the memories of 
destruction, human rights violations, history, and the past (all of which are sub-
stantial components of heritage construction). Second, Transitional Justice offers 
the establishment of a legal framework with international endorsement for com-
munities to come to terms with events that impede the reconstruction of socie-
ties linked to troubled past, contested memories, and war. As such, it opens a path 
to attend to the management and potential development of the heritage that has 
long been neglected in Famagusta. Third, Transitional Justice provides a platform 
for opening up the dialogue necessary to set the conditions for “a future”. Those 
aspects that embody the difficulties of a transition are also reflected in cultural 
heritage, and are particularly salient in Famagusta: a site with no international rec-
ognition, at the heart of divided communities, with severe management difficul-
ties, a recipient of memories that speak of hybridity, disconnection, fragmentation 
and evolution and above all a site with a history that transcends the boundaries of 
Cyprus, the Mediterranean, and Europe.
As a legal concept, Transitional Justice is still a work in progress. Harvey 
M. Weinstein is among the leading scholars engaged in defining the principles be-
hind Transitional Justice: its applicability, the conditions it requires to work, and 
how the concept is related to broader fields such as history, human rights, political 
transformation, truths, and even heritage legitimization and management.19 Ac-
cording to the International Center of Transitional Justice: 
Transitional justice refers to the set of judicial and non-judicial measures that have 
been implemented by different countries in order to redress the legacies of massive 
human rights abuses. These measures include criminal prosecutions, truth commis-
sions, reparations programs, and various kinds of institutional reforms.20 
19 For additional information on the work of Harvey Weinstein, see J. Halpern, H.M. Weinstein, Empathy 
and Rehumanization After Mass Violence, in: E. Stover, H.M. Weinstein (eds.), My Neighbor, My Enemy: Justice 
and Community in the Aftermath of Mass Atrocity, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2004; M. Biro 
et al., Attitudes Toward Justice and Social Reconstruction in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, in: E. Stover, 
H.M. Weinstein (eds.), op. cit.; P. Vinck, P.N. Pham, E. Stover, H.M. Weinstein, Exposure to War Crimes and 
its Implications for Peace Building in Northern Uganda, “Journal of the American Medical Association” 2007, 
Vol. 298; H. Liebling Kalifani, et al., Violence against Women in Northern Uganda: the Neglected Health Conse-
quences of War, “Journal of International Women’s Studies” 2008, Vol. 9. 
20 See the full text: What is Transitional Justice?, http://ictj.org/about/transitional-justice [accessed: 
18.09.2015].
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In short, Transitional Justice is a malleable and flexible concept, capable of 
adapting to specific conditions (political, religious, ethnic, ethical and geographi-
cal, among others) and providing the conditions to overcome the difficulties of the 
present, while cultural heritage as a system has and provides fixed principles, with 
the capacity to add features and classifications,21 thus preventing the inclusion of 
unaligned forms of thinking. 
Application of the perspective of Transitional Justice would liberate the cul-
tural heritage in Famagusta from the need to be included on a “world list” or be part 
of a “world classification”. Instead, it would allow it to be seen as a moral endeavour 
that does not need further assessment or comparison. Furthermore, when heritage 
is framed as a Human Right, it becomes a legal issue, which thus gives it a different 
weight and relevance, above local legislation. This is precisely one of the core dif-
ficulties Famagusta faces – the accountability of local governments over the future 
of its heritage assets. The legal aspects of cultural heritage detached from value, 
and beyond national boundaries and local legitimacy, begin to reveal the fluidity of 
its conceptualization. As I have stated, this conceptualization speaks of the need 
for preservation of such assets without an additional set of values and categoriza-
tions attached to their conservation.22 Cultural heritage simply exists, and needs 
no further argument. 
All conflicitive societies face the need for a closure process and the design of 
a “next stage”, which vacillates between what is true, what is historically accepted 
or proposed, how communities maintain a sense of identity over troubled times, 
and how “others” identify them and their role during conflict. Here I present 
 
21 An interesting example is provided in the analysis of what is, in UNESCO’s classification, “Cultural 
Landscapes”: “The term ‘cultural landscape’ embraces a diversity of manifestations of the interaction be-
tween humankind and its natural environment. […] Protection of cultural landscapes can contribute to 
modern techniques of sustainable land-use and can maintain or enhance natural values in the landscape. 
The continued existence of traditional forms of land-use supports biological diversity in many regions of 
the world. The protection of traditional cultural landscapes is therefore helpful in maintaining biological 
diversity” (Cultural Landscapes, UNESCO, 1992, http://whc.unesco.org/en/culturallandscape/#1 [accessed: 
18.09.2015]). This classification should be compared with also FAO’s Globally Important Agricultural Her-
itage Systems: “Worldwide, specific agricultural systems and landscapes have been created, shaped and 
maintained by generations of farmers and herders based on diverse natural resources, using locally adapt-
ed management practices. Building on local knowledge and experience, these ingenious agricultural sys-
tems reflect the evolution of humankind, the diversity of its knowledge, and its profound relationship with 
nature […]” (Biodiversity and Agricultural Heritage, FAO, 2002, http://www.fao.org/biodiversity/cross-sec-
toral-issues/agricultural-heritage/en/ [accessed: 18.09.2015]). 
The fact that there is no apparent difference between these two terms highlights one of UNESCO’s most 
troublesome limitations: the recognition of nation-states as the main and accountable stakeholder of cul-
tural heritage. For UNESCO, in Cyprus the only accountable stakeholder is the Republic of Cyprus. 
22 In this regard, it is important to ask if the traditional view on cultural heritage conservation, which – un-
til now – has focused its actions only on the physicality of the asset, can shift its meaning to an alternative 
perspective, in which conservation refers to the connections heritage is capable of establishing between 
diverse communities, at different moments in time and under various forms of governance. 
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some examples that help – by contrast – illuminate the case of Famagusta. The 
first is van Riebeeck’s Hedge in South Africa, which is a colonial garden from 
Dutch occupation times, with Victorian forms and foreign species. It was adorned 
with a plaque that read: 
This hedge of wild almonds was planted in the year 1660 A.D. by order of Commander 
Jan van Riebeeck as to mark the southern frontier of Cape Town Colony, from Kirst-
enbosh along Wynberg Hill, to a point below the Hen and Chickens Rocks. Thence the 
hedge continued by a fence of poles across the camp ground to the mouth of the Salt 
River.23
This plaque was subsequently removed and replaced by a more subtle one, 
thus establishing two versions of the same site. The new plaque says: 
This wild almond hedge was planted in 1660 by order of Commander Jan van Riebeeck 
as a barrier protecting the expanding European population against the indigenous 
Koisan inhabitants of the Cape. The hedge stretched from Kirstenbosch along Wyn-
berg Hill to a point below the Hen and Chickens Rocks. Beyond this the barrier contin-
ued as a pole fence to the mouth of the Salt River. The hedge has come to be a symbol 
of exclusion.24
On the other hand, Singapore´s only World Heritage Site listed in 2015 is the 
Botanic Gardens. A city-state with three main ethnicities (Malay, Chinese and In-
dian) and three belief systems (Hindu, Muslim and Buddhism) decided to nomi-
nate a garden that honours colonial times, seemingly walking away from heritage 
and embracing nation-building. Once the site was listed as a World Heritage Site, 
Singapore’s Minister of Culture Lawrence Wong emphasized that in the total land 
area of the world, (48.94 million km²), there are only 1000 World Heritage Sites, 
and one of those sites is the Botanic Gardens, located in Singapore, a tiny island 
of approximately 700 km². In other words, he asserted that Singapore is of world 
importance. 
This affirmation was later reinforced by Minister Wong at the Daniel S. Sand-
ers Memorial Lecture for the 19th International Symposium of the International 
Consortium for Social Development (ICSD 2015), where on 9 July 2015 he stated 
the following: 
You see it in the way we unite together around our heritage, around our well-loved 
places, like the Singapore Botanic Gardens, which was recently inscribed as our first 
ever UNESCO World Heritage Site. […] The domains of arts, heritage, sports, and 
 
 
23 L. Lixinski, Cultural Heritage Law and Transitional Justice: Lessons from South Africa, “International Journal 
of Transitional Justice” 2015, Vol. 9, pp. 278-287.
24 Ibidem.
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community also help to fortify our sense of nationhood. In a world of ever-increas-
ing automation and efficiency, I believe that these softer aspects of our humanity 
become even  more important. These are the things that shape our national identity. 
And a national identity is what makes a society resilient amid turbulence and de-
structive change. A national identity is what enables the whole to be greater than 
the sum of its parts.25
Europe’s experience in dealing with the difficult memories in its recent his-
tory has indubitably been strenuous. The Second World War left open wounds 
throughout much of the continent, wounds which continue to raise discussions on 
how to address the past, its complexity, and the consequences for the present. 
The defeat of the Nazi regime left unresolved a number of questions, at the heart 
of which was how to deal with a Nazi past which many European societies pos-
sessed in one form or another. Germany, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and 
Hungary have explicitly addressed issues of accountability and justice, therefore 
of memory (outside the national narrative), collective remembering (not the same 
as collective memory), and embarked upon the search for answers to heal the 
wounds of war. At different times and for a variety of reasons, Spain, Portugal, 
Greece and Poland have also ventured on several processes of memory telling, 
truth discovery, and justice.26 
This cornucopia of complexities and unresolved questions remaining in Eu-
rope are also visible and linger on in Famagusta. Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cyp-
riots have nurtured their differences throughout the years, and new communities 
that are not engaged in that dilemma have arrived in the island (immigrants from 
Africa, Turkey, the Philippines, Russia and the Middle East, among others), com-
munities which also require space in society to build their own memories in a his-
torically multicultural island. If North Cyprus is seen as a transitional stage rather 
than a place that has reached a status quo, it is possible to come to terms with 
a past that still presents serious difficulties for the future of the island. While cul-
tural heritage has served numerous ideologies throughout time, the Cyprus case 
25 See the full text: Speech By Mr Lawrence Wong, Minister For Culture, Community And Youth & Second Min-
ister For Communications And Information, At The Daniel S. Sanders Memorial Lecture For The 19th International 
Symposium Of The International Consortium For Social Development (ICSD 2015) On 9 July 2015, http://www.
unisim.edu.sg/Happenings/speeches/Pages/S2015-7.aspx [accessed: 5.10.2015].
26 For more on Transitional Justice, see Ch.J. Colvin, Purity and Planning: Shared Logics of Transitional Jus-
tice and Development, “The International Journal of Transitional Justice” 2008, Vol. 2, pp. 412-425; J. Elster, 
Coming to Terms with the Past: A Framework for the Study of Justice in Transition to Democracy, “European Jour-
nal of Sociology” 1998, Vol. 39; C. Hesse, R. Post (eds.), Human Rights in Political Transitions: Gettysburg to 
Bosnia, Zone Books, New York 1999; N.J. Kritz, The Dilemmas of Transitional Justice, in: N.J. Kritz (ed.), Tran-
sitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Recon with Former Regimes, United States Institute of Peace Press, 
Washington DC, 1995, pp. xix-xxx; A. Margalit, The Ethics of Memory, Harvard University Press, Cambridge 
(MA) 2002; H. Rousso, History of Memory, Politics of the Past: What For?, in: K. Jarausch, T. Lindenberger (eds.), 
Conflicted Memories: Europeanizing Contemporary History, Berghahn, Oxford 2007; R.G. Teitel, Transitional 
Justice Genealogy, “Harvard Human Rights Journal” 2003, Vol. 16, pp. 69-94. 
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offers the possibility to design a narrative with connections to a future where 
there is no fear for the past, because truth is reachable for all. In the following 
section, the linkages between cultural heritage, memory, and memorialization 
will be discussed, followed by an assessment of the application of Transitional 
Justice in managing the cultural heritage in Cyprus. 
Applying a Transitional Justice Framework 
to the Cultural Heritage of Cyprus 
Transitional Justice tackles the need to remember, as well as remind, by proposing 
memories and actions to encourage remembrance. I suggest that at the very core 
of this process, cultural heritage assets provide a malleable means to remember, 
remind and establish clear connections to memory and the past. The connections 
between history, memory, and Transitional Justice will here be explored in the case 
of cultural heritage in Famagusta.
Memory is a distinct field of study and an evolving concept, which can be de-
fined from various vantage points. I consider the concept of memory as basis for 
valuing cultural heritage in a dynamic and evolving manner. This is in part because 
cultural heritage has been used to erase, transform, and manipulate those mem-
ories that contained inherent conflict for governmental structures, countries and 
dictatorships around the world. However, memory helps in post-conflict recovery. 
Cultural heritage can be used to substantiate and demonstrate that some memo-
ries, even when difficult to deal with, are necessary for the reconstruction of soci-
etal structures and healing. 
The fact that Famagusta has witnessed, throughout its existence, such a vari-
ety of cultures means that a variety of tools are needed to assess events in terms 
of both heritage formation and destruction. The link between remembering and 
forgetting has been brought into focus by the 1974 conflict. The changes of street 
and village names, for example, gives an idea of how much the current community 
wants to drive away a past that is full of turbulent times by erasing those things 
that could remind them of it: the village called Tatlisu changed to Akantou; Kaza-
fani to Ozanköy, etc. When analysing this situation, it can be seen that the use of 
new names signified the recognition of changes which had been resisted for more 
than four decades by the previous communities, which were displaced. 
Cultural heritage – as it stands now – is entrenched in the idea of conservation, 
and conservation has been developed as part of the idea of territoriality, nationali-
ty and identity. However, the value of Famagusta involves its representation of the 
legacy of conflicts that transformed the place throughout time. The series of wars 
and conflicts in Famagusta, involving commerce, religion etc., has had profound 
effects on buildings, decorations, craftsmanship, etc. All this gives Cyprus a sin-
gularity, and Famagusta a unique status as a witness of various times, eras, styles, 
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and also conflicts. For example, Saint Nicholas´s Cathedral in Famagusta held the 
coronation of the King of Jerusalem throughout the Lusignan era (from 1186); sub-
sequently the building was modified and converted into the Lala Mustafa Pasha 
Mosque during Ottoman times. 
The pain that conflict brings into the memories of communities has become 
a form of denial, or has resulted in forms of nationalism that also represent denial. 
What would be left in Famagusta if its memories of conflict were erased? Probably 
very little. A walk throughout Famagusta is generally an opportunity to think about 
the past, destruction, epochs, empires, technology and war. Opportunities arise 
on every corner to reflect on society’s values. How does one complete a city that 
seems to be in a permanent state of incompleteness, and endow it with opportuni-
ties to live a dignified life in the near future? This is a question I have asked myself 
at many different moments during my work in Cyprus. How does one organize the 
puzzle of time in fair way, so that we do not incubate more destruction, more con-
flict and more segregation? Certainly the “flag” of cultural heritage has shown its 
distinct limitations in this regard over the past fifty years. 
The neglect of Famagusta’s cultural heritage is reflected in two phenomena. 
First, a great number of the current community living in the centre of town have 
been “resettled”, coming originally from mainland Turkey, and so have limited 
connections with the heritage site. Secondly, the question of a practical settle-
ment creates uncertainty for the future and the risk of a loss of “autonomy”. This 
fact demonstrates the futility and irrelevance of addressing heritage in terms of 
identity or national pride, when the reality is such that the cultural heritage in 
Famagusta is profoundly disconnected from the communities living in it, and re-
quires new meanings to re-construct its significance for and between the citizens 
and their physical context. The re-framing of cultural heritage to include a Transi-
tional Justice framework could help build up a real civil society and create a sense 
of belonging and ownership of those buildings and structures that currently com-
municate so very little to their inhabitants. The dynamism and evolution of the 
cultural heritage model proposed here can remedy the loss of identity which has 
emerged from four decades in limbo, making it accessible to residents as well as 
visitors. A response to unconventional forms of conflict might be unconvention-
al forms of societies, with cultural heritage and its memory component playing 
a key role.
Cyprus is a transnational place. The North makes little sense without the 
South, and vice versa. The way the island shaped its connections to the world over 
the centuries, the way it structured its cities and ports, its agriculture and customs, 
are distorted by the latest division into boundaries, and even if there is a settle-
ment, the roots of Cypriots lie in every corner of the island. In this case, a forceful 
transition can unfold into new ethnic disturbances, religious unrest, and a new cy-
cle of conflict. A transitional stage is designed to address the issues that are unre-
solved and prevent them from being exacerbated in the future. As Craig Calhoun 
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puts it, “a strong public sphere where the past can be addressed depends upon a fa-
vourable organization of civil society”.27 This approach is not focused only on the 
past, but also on aspects such as the economy, inequity, and unemployment which 
the emergence of a new (post-conflict) system might bring with it.
Hence, Transitional Justice is a process necessary for healing. Victims and per-
petrators require forms of expressions and institutions to recognize their role in the 
conflict. Although many would wish to forget, healing or coming to terms with the 
past creates a long lasting “wellness” for the whole of society. Other aspects that 
are relevant during transitional processes deal with unresolved issues concerning 
property (although some would like to believe Famagusta does not have such is-
sues), the tenure of nationalized buildings, access to official documents on missing 
persons, truth, religious property, oral history and memorialization. But these are 
aspects of the Cyprus issue that probably no governmental organization (either in 
North Cyprus or in the Republic of Cyprus) is willing to confront.
The stage of transition that I use to frame Famagusta’s cultural heritage is one 
that is generally employed after a conflict, internal conflict, or a process of trans-
formational change in political terms, for example from a totalitarian military dic-
tatorship to democracy, or from communism to a different form of government. 
Changes are frequently ushered in with violence, and violence impinges on human 
rights. Transition itself is a historical process in which many facts, events and truths 
are unclear and therefore misleading. History is as much necessary in a transitional 
process to understand the events that led to violence or conflict as it is necessary 
to document the violence itself. It gives clarity to past events, their causes, and 
their consequences. More than factual, history in relation to transitional stages and 
justice has a role in the prevention of forgetting.28 
Transitional Justice is a tool to assist in coming to terms with the past in 
conditions where law, human rights, violence and truth are permeated by mixed 
emotions and subjectivities. Cultural heritage here becomes a main component 
in truth telling and remembrance, which facilitates the coexistence of multiple 
narratives and versions of the past: historical, sociological, psychological, and “of-
ficial”. It also welcomes a dynamic re-assessment of events that can be interpret-
ed in multiple ways. The relevance of cultural heritage is fundamental to the Tran-
sitional Justice process to help us understand that history is incomplete when 
memories are missing from its narratives. Memory, as Pierre Nora describes it, is 
what history dismisses: 
27 O. Simić, Z. Volčič, Transitional Justice and Civil Society in the Balkans, Springer, New York 2013, p. 4.
28 N. Wouters, The Use of History in the Field of Transitional Justice: A Critical Introduction, in: N. Wouters 
(ed.), Transitional Justice and Memory in Europe (1945-2013), Intersentia, Cambridge 2014, p. 18.
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What we are now in the habit of calling ‘memory’ is in reality the history of those who 
have been forgotten by History, those who have been excluded from official history 
because they live in the margins of society; hence the founding connection between 
memory and minority groupings.29 
A transitional scenario yields the opportunity to incorporate heritage as 
a  main component of life in Cyprus, and as such it opens the possibility to re-
frame it, re-define it and re-develop it, in ways that recognize the transnationality 
of its nature, its role in the memory of Europe, and its key role in the rebuilding 
of a society that has endured so much for so long. It is clear that places and terri-
tories that have endured a conflict require, in the process of overcoming events 
from the past, forms of remembrance, mechanisms to make peace with the past, 
and the assurance that the places of memory will remain as part of a narrative 
that is closer to society, and more distant from nationalism and politics. In addi-
tion to memories, remembrance, and historic events and their relationship with 
identity, cultural heritage sites remain as assets that can permanently become 
sources of new interpretations, new discoveries, and new discourses. These also 
include difficult memories. 
Applying a transitional scenario also gives heritage assets a more permanent 
presence in the locus of a community. The separation of cultural heritage from 
memory, as established in the international cultural heritage system, has permit-
ted the manipulation of the past, framed as history. At the end of the day, I as-
sume that the tenets of a holistic Transitional Justice process in Famagusta would 
unlock a whole process of confronting the prevailing issues in Famagusta. In this 
process, cultural heritage would not only serve as a means to overcome the polit-
ical barriers and instigate efforts to deal with the history of wars, conflicts, and 
displacements that have plagued Cyprus. It would also be subjected to a proper 
management model with the help of the international civil society (NGOs), the pri-
vate sector, and the general public. 
The recent works in one of the remaining buildings in the Armenian quarter 
(known as the Armenian Church) and the meticulous job in securing a wall paint-
ing called the “Forty Martyrs” make an important contribution to the reading of 
the past – the far past in the form of physical materials, and the recent one, in the 
form of memories. The participation of neutral actors, additional stakeholders 
and non-political organizations such as international NGOs places Famagusta 
at a level where an open discussion is possible on the shape of society Cyprus 
is projecting for the future. By applying the framework of Transitional Justice 
within Cyprus, the potential the Armenian Church and the Armenian quarter in-
clude the following: 1) Memorialization of the events of 1915 (Armenian ethnic 
 
29 H.K. Anheier, Y.R. Isar, The Cultures and Globalization Series 4: Heritage, Memory & Identity, Sage Publica-
tions, London 2011, p. x.
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cleansing) and 1974 (Turkish military occupation of the quarter); 2) Participation 
of neutral international stakeholders (Nanyang Technological University and 
the World Monument Fund); 3) Remediation, by providing a neutral location for 
the Armenian community to hold memories; 4) Reinterpretation and the inclusion 
of narratives that are openly painful but necessary to deal with; and 5) Re-con-
ceptualization of a heritage site and the re-formulation of values to allow the Ar-
menian quarter (Church included) to develop and establish contemporary links 
and connections in order to secure its future. 
Farida Shaheed, a special rapporteur in the field of cultural rights, points out 
that since the establishment of her mandate on Transitional Justice in 2009, she has 
received numerous testimonies stressing the importance of historical and memo-
rial narratives as shapers of collective identities and cultural heritage. She added 
that “I also noted that, all too often, a cultural rights-based approach to transition-
al justice and reconciliation strategies is not rendered the attention it deserves.”30 
In the case of Cyprus, the application of Transitional Justice would open up a plat-
form for the emergence of various historical and memorial narratives from the side 
of both the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots, as well as those in between. 
There is a need, and also an opportunity for cultural expressions to recover their 
role in building communities under the aegis of contemporary and realistic values, 
identities, and a sense of time, place, and space. 
However, there are a number of features of the participation of governmen-
tal institutions which threaten the Transitional Justice process, which include: 
1)  The way in which transition is recognized – For North Cyprus the aim is in-
ternational recognition, while for the Republic of Cyprus it is submission to, or 
absorption within, the current institutions. These contradictory goals make al-
most any scenario unfeasible, and the transitional stage is likely to devolve into 
conflict; 2) Division – Forty years of division have permeated all levels of govern-
ment: education, economy, religion and family, and these divisions are not likely 
to change easily or soon; 3) Involvement of a sovereign nation – Turkey and its 
presence in North Cyprus turns the Cyprus issue into an international affair that 
the region has allowed. Should Turkey also become involved in the Transitional 
Justice process, the matter could easily devolve.
In the aftermath of conflicts, including the one in Cyprus, international organ-
izations under the umbrella of the UN are not capable of either avoiding or driving 
out the politics of conflict. How could they when they are, in principle, the product 
of political agreements and exist to honour them? Contrary to popular perceptions, 
 
 
30 Full text: Integrating cultural rights in transitional justice strategies in post-conflict societies, UNHR, 
24  March 2014, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/Integratingculturalrightsinpost-conflict-
societies.aspx [accessed: 18.09.2015].
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the United Nations Peacekeeping Mission in Cyprus has been limited in terms ef-
fectively protecting or improving the cultural heritage in Cyprus, being subject to 
the political environment in the island for the past forty years. Its presence has 
been and still is a political component of the island’s landscape, and that, I would 
argue, has prevented more global action in aspects such as cultural heritage and its 
broad conceptualization. It is unlikely that the memories that took place in Cyprus 
in the recent past can be accommodated in the rhetoric of cultural heritage as un-
derstood by UNESCO, while its real tenets are fundamental to prevent segregation 
and exclusion.
Conclusions
Within the Transitional Justice framework, I have described the connections be-
tween memory, transition, human rights and justice, and suggested how cultural 
heritage could help in bridging the existing fissures and offering new perspectives 
and links, for example to remembrance and memorialization. However, the role 
of governments in initiatives such as Transitional Justice is not clear. Is it neces-
sary to recognize whether the political will exists and ask how the institutions in 
Cyprus would react to the proposed scenario? What is clear is that Transitional 
Justice is a process that involves the civil society at large – beyond political and re-
ligious actors, beyond generations and beyond the historic narratives of the past – 
and will eventually be addressed in Cyprus. It is a process that needs to be carried 
out for Cyprus, in Cyprus, and with the participation of Cypriots. Civil society must 
be present. It is important to ask how Transitional Justice will be implemented in 
Cyprus. What are the necessary settings or institutions that must be present in 
order for it to work? I imagine a Transitional Justice process in Cyprus motivated 
by civil society at both the local and global levels. Transitional Justice is a grow-
ing movement around the world, with many experiences in different regions, and 
enough scholarship exists to build a network of endorsements from academics, le-
gal practitioners, non-governmental institutions and the international community 
and, potentially, offer an alternative to cultural heritage that would finally relate 
to societies in the making. 
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